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logic to the necessary laws of thought, or practically to the demonstrative evolution of conclusions from premises that are given. He does not inquire into the manner of obtaining the premises, but only into the certainty and safety of that purely intellectual process by which, as verbal propositions, they are found to hold those other verbal propositions known as conclusions. The whole movement is thus detached from facts as facts, and, according to the general use of words, is, when reasoning at all, deductive reasoning. That is, the conclusions are wholly contained in, and demonstratively taken from, the premises. Hamilton gives a technical and peculiar application to the words inductive and deductive, regards both forms of reasoning as equally demonstrative, and leaves wholly out of his logic that true induction, usually so-called, to the elucidation of which Mill has given his entire strength. Induction in its commonly accepted meaning, the establishment of a general principle through a limited number of specific examples, is all the reasoning which the sensualistic school can consistently recognize. What others regard as deductive reasoning, they are compelled to look upon in ultimate analysis as inductive. Deduction can be nothing more with them than the re-statement of a specific case already included in the establishment of the general principle, or major premise, from which it is now taken. No conclusion is strictly demonstrative, since it is in advance of the premises on which it rests. The degrees of evidence for new statements, statements not confirmed by direct observation, vary with the amount and character of experience on which they rest.

The entire system of logic, therefore, as presented by Hamilton, has for them comparatively little value. It is a cunning play upon words, rather than an estimate of facts. They are interested in the growth of laws, principles, out