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and that all the peculiarities of the cognition correspond to that hypothesis, it comes to be shown that the ultimate elements into which that cognition is decomposable the relation of co-existence can itself be gained only by experience the utter untenableness of the Kantian doctrine will become manifest." Pages 243-4.

Herein our author hardly agrees with himself, having insisted that the co-existent points, A, B, Z, can not give the idea of extension, though it now turns out that a knowledge of their co-existence would have been essentially a knowledge of space. We believe (1) that the notion of any simple position involves that of space, is explained under it, and therefore that a single sensation of touch, complex indeed, yet regarded as simple, might call forth the idea. This we do not care to dwell on, as it is doubtless in connection with many simultaneous and serial phenomena, presented in several senses, that the notion actually does arise. We can not accept the statement that the ultimate element into which the cognition, space, is decomposable, is co-existence. On the other hand, (2) the notion of external, material co-existence is subsequent in the order of thought to that of space. Nor are the two by any means the same. I may have the idea of empty space. I may put one object in it, or two or three objects in it, but the idea of space has preceded each and all before they became to me external objects, or the images of such objects. Indeed, (3) simple co-existence, as of an act of memory and a thought, of a thought and a feeling, does not involve the idea of space. The contrast of the inner and the outer, of the ego and non-ego, may or may not go forward; but the first step in such a contrast, the initial stroke of light in handling a local sensation, is the localizing idea of space. How often, and how long I may have one, two, three sensations, and not expound them, is simply the question, How