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with paralyzed organs. A recognition of blindness, or even deafness, should be one of space. If, however, the fact of a vacant organ becomes significant only in connection with a process of mind, we wish to know under what guiding clue that process proceeds. What is brought to the explanation of the fact of motion without sensation? It seems to us that but one answer can be given space. This conception as absolutely simple must come, when it comes, in (1) a complete form; coming completely, it must come (2) suddenly; and, (3) till it comes, no experience is intelligible under it.

Spencer, with the marked approval of Bain, makes, in another phase of the argument, the notion of space dependent on co-existence, and co-existence the fruit of experience.

"Not only is it that the idea of space involves the idea of co-existence, but it is that the idea of co-existence involves the idea of space. Fundamentally space and coexistence are two sides of the same cognition."

"On the one hand space can not be thought of without co-existent positions being thought of; on the other hand co-existence can not be thought of without at least two points in space being thought of. A relation of co-existence implies two somethings that co-exist. Two somethings can not occupy absolutely the same point in space. And hence co-existence implies space. Space can be known only as presenting relations of co-existence; relations of co-existence can be known only as presented in space."

"If now it should turn out under an ultimate analysis that a relation of co-existence is not directly cognizable, but is cognizable only by a duplex act of thought only by a comparison of experiences; the question between the transcendentalists and their opponents will be set finally at rest. When after it has been shown as above, that our cognition of space in its totality is explicable upon the experience hypothesis,