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has in it more than the first, to wit, this occasion of a judgment? As sensations they are alike; one is no more stimulating than the other and, to the sense, should yield no more than the other.

The solution lies in the fact, that the mind is able to furnish an idea, that of agreement and disagreement, infusing rational order and relations into a plurality of objects, and brings it forward for immediate application, on this the first occasion. Here the judgment finds its function and office to run between phenomena, and marshal them under notions. Of phenomena alone it could make nothing. It must have its men, and its plan of rank and regiment, and then it can construct an army.

Of the same character are the judgments, This is higher than that, This event is more recent than that. In each case objects of perception are thrown into relation with each other, by means of a regulative idea. Many, accepting the intuitive nature of the idea of space, would easily recognize the character of the judgment, This house is nearer than the mountain, who would yet fail to see the transcendental element in the kindred statement, This stone is like that rock. Evidently the mind furnishes the ground of the judgment, the idea of the relation, as much in the one case as in the other. The present division of judgments includes all acts of classification, and is a most numerous one.

The statement, This action is right, may sometimes be one of classification, assigning the act by its form to a kind or class previously recognized as right. More frequently, however, it is a judgment of the first class, in which a single act is stated and interpreted under an intuitive notion. The notion right is not perceived in the action, but brought to it, discerned as a spiritual factor in it. If it had been redness that had belonged to the object, the mind must needs have waited for a second, third, fourth instance before it