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action; or they may become the occasions of thought, and the inquiry be instituted, whether they are of one kind, or of different kinds. For the first result there are necessarily present appetites and senses; for the second, rationalizing power, which is no other than the power to furnish an idea, in this case, that of resemblance, under which an inquiry can be instituted and a judgment formed. It is the exact office of the judgment to apply discriminatingly, in reference to an end, these notions to the objects before the mind. The sensations, as sensations are complete. They are not halves; they are not uneasy, nettlesome, looking out for mates; nor adhesive, linked, dragging something after them; nor are they dove- tailed into thoughts, making their succession inevitable. They might lie forever perfectly quiet, nothing coming of them, were it not for the appetites below them, into which they sink by physical connections; for the eye of reason above them, into whose realm of thought they rise, by the dropping down upon them of judgments, through tentative inquiries prompted by its own perception of invisible, unheard, unfelt relations. This working up of sensations, this vitalizing of them in processes of thought, needs solution, as much so as the activity of chemical elements previously dormant, when heat is applied.

We know an object as red, as sour, as fragrant, through our respective senses of sight, taste, and smell. A judgment has nothing to do with this knowledge. The first object received in any sense imparts to it a form of knowing, in itself ultimate and inexplicable. When we meet with a second object of a like kind, we have no new sensational knowledge; yet we have an occasion of a judgment, which we did not have, as regards the quality, the flavor, or odor, or color in the first case. We say of the two, They are the same. Now how happens it that the second sensation