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ground for a comparison between them. It is simply an application to the phenomenon of a regulative idea. The finger is pierced. A single, sharp feeling is present. We say, it is painful; a judgment which, restated to give its substance distinct expression, becomes, Pain is. Here the specific experience is taken under the general notion of existence, and we call the result a thought, a judgment that may be offered to another mind. Between the idea of existence and that of pain, there is no resemblance, for I could have as readily affirmed it of a pleasure, of a color, an odor. This judgment, the type of a large class, a step by which any experience whatever receives a form of statement and becomes an intellectual product, is bringing to a phenomenon one of the regulative, formative notions pertinent to it

But I might have said The pain is one, The pain lasts, The pain is here. In each of these cases, I should have brought forward a different idea, and affirmed its application in a given form to the sensation. Now, if these ideas are themselves previous sensations, then the doctrine that resemblance forms the substance of every judgment holds good, but not otherwise. If for instance the idea of duration be entirely distinct from the whole and every part of the sensation that evokes it, and is ready to be furnished by the mind to each of twenty or twenty thousand sensations that endure, in order that they may singly or collectively be made intelligible in this relation of time, then this judgment, It endures, is one whose predicate and subject are totally distinct in kind, received through diverse powers, and united in another relation than that of agreement by a third power. In this example we suppose a mastery of language, which does indeed in its acquisition imply comparison. This fact, however, does not weaken the analytic proof, since we can suppose the judgment to be present without the words to express it, or a present mastery of