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many products of comparison: in the third, that judgment, in the fourth, that reasoning, is identical with comparison."

That resemblance, or, stated on both sides, agreement and disagreement, is the sole ground of connection between subject and predicate in a judgment; that comparison is the only act of mind involved in reasoning, are conclusions quite consonant with a philosophy that derives all the data and the conditions of thought from the phenomenal world, from perception and consciousness; but is wholly "at war with a philosophy that accepts those ideas which illuminate facts and make them intelligible subjects of thought, as of supersensual origin, furnished by the mind itself as adjuncts of its comprehending powers. If we deal purely with phenomena, we can only compare them, discover and assert their agreements and disagreements. If, then, we do more than this in judgment, this limited statement should recoil against the system that puts it forth, whose ultimate and consistent product it undoubtedly is. That all judgments do not rest on resemblance will appear in the analysis of the action of the mind in predication in the office which thought performs.

We believe a judgment always to involve the direct or indirect application of a regulative idea to the phenomena included under it, and this is its peculiar feature and occasion. Using an undesirable word, judgment is the rationalizing of sensations, it is completing them in thought, through those ideas which the mind furnishes in making them objects of rational contemplation. The full force and proof of this statement can not be easily seen previous to a detailed statement and establishment of these native forms of thought; yet a little analysis may render it intelligible. Every single perception admits of a judgment, which is the product of the first action of thought upon it. This statement has no two perceptions to deal with, and therefore no