of "merely human reason." It is characteristic of upholders of this view to collect a few instances of imperfection in human theory, such as the difficulties that beset Spencer and Huxley, then argue that these failures show the incompetency of human reason. These partisans never mention, if acquainted with, the greatest reasoners and system-makers of the world. To refer to the great systems would be in fact to spoil the contrast between these "weak attempts" and the "flawless structure" of divine revelation. It is tacitly admitted, however, that even revealed truth becomes true for man only so far as he employs his reason. Not even the most zealous partisan can deny this, because it is well known that believers in revelation do not agree, that texts and interpretations differ. When authorities differ, the only standard is reason. There must then be a criterion which like a mathematical statement is demonstrable apart from any particular mind or group of minds. But this is reason itself, a power which every human being can attain.

The so-called "unaided reason of man" is a myth. No one of us can know the simplest truth or reality apart from the relationship with our fellows which shows what is common, capable of withstanding tests. Reality is social, exists for men in a mutual world. Truth becomes ours in so far as we eliminate the preconceptions and emotions