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free, the point can only be fairly settled by re-opening the entire discussion; for it is antecedently no more improbable that matter is free, than it is that matter is conscious, and intelligent. The forces concerned in intellectual action are either conditioned from within to all the facts of mind, and we are remitted to consciousness to determine what these facts are in their entire complement; or these forces are conditioned to their action from without. If we accept the first statement, we have recognized two kinds of forces or activities utterly distinct from each other; if we accept the last, we have used two words, and called one set of forces appearing in space, material; and the same forces arising in consciousness, mental; thus overlooking the distinctions between them. What possible explanation is there in this? Do not the fundamental differences between matter and mind, open to all our faculties, remain as before? It would be well for philosophers to remember that theories can not reflexively wipe out facts, and that those of mind are of the most primitive and undeniable order. If either of the two classes of facts is to be merged in the other, physical ones necessarily yield to those of mind, as in their nature secondary, being known only as they affect consciousness. As the material world is at best reached inferentially, it can not logically displace the very faculties that know it. The knowing must have precedence of the thing known. If either is to be found to contain the other, it must be the first the second, not the second the first.

Materialism does not always assume the crude form now controverted. It has sometimes a more mixed and subtle character, one in which it is partially blended with idealism. Mr. Mill, while deriving all knowledge from experience, and declining to recognize any intuitive elements, nevertheless leaves the existence of matter in doubt. Sensations and perceptions are accepted in an ideal form, and