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separation and reunion, by things or events new or unexpected, by wit and by humor; and those of the second order are desires. There are obscure feelings of comfort which attend on the habitual in action, and of discomfort which arise from the interruption of habits. There is a large mass of less obscure feelings of satisfaction and discomfort which are connected with the presence or absence of friends. Wonder is a more purely intellectual feeling, and is awakened by things new in our experience. Surprise is a yet stronger feeling elicited by that which contradicts our expectations. Both indicate the wakefulness of the intellect to a change of data. Wit is the joining of ideas apt to our purpose by an unexpected relation; humor is the joining of things or images apt to our purpose by an unexpected relation. Things are in this definition opposed to ideas in the former definition, but include persons. The unexpected relation of the first definition refers to some secondary or remote connection as opposed to the philosophical connections of thought; in the 4 second definition, it indicates an unaccustomed, and incongruous link. Though the feelings that accompany wit and humor are of an intellectual order, they may be easily united, as in ridicule, to personal feelings. All of this order of feelings turn on the familiar and unfamiliar. In habit both mind and body are involved; in associations, the emotions and the thoughts; while in wonder, surprise, wit and humor, the thoughts are deeply concerned.

The second more intense order is composed of the desires. These may be termed the appetites of the mind, as they express its appetencies, its longings, its objects of pursuit. They have been usually spoken of as directly native feelings. Herein there seems to be some confusion of ideas. If they were direct, unreasoning impulses, they could not fall into the second general class of feelings, to wit: those