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highest. The second belongs chiefly to man, though in a few of the nobler animals, it finds partial presentation in connection with the tacit anticipations, the informal conclusions of association. The dog does, through the education of a retentive memory, permanently interlock what, for want of another word, we must call conceptions, and is, therefore, ready for the feeling of joy or fear in view of anticipated results. Yet, in fullness and variety, these emotions do not compare in the most sagacious brute with the corresponding class of feelings in man. Indeed, much that we regard of this character in the animals below us, is but the false, the flattering interpretation which we bring from consciousness for the explanation of acts, in their external form alone, like ours. The dog licks the hand of his master, and that master conceives it, not as the act of a blind, instinctive fellowship, worth intellectually no more than the good-will of the cow that cards with her rough tongue the hide of her gratified companion, but as a distinct expression of a clearly defined attachment. The third class, from the nature of the case, belongs exclusively to man, and, in its full forms, to the cultivated, the developed man, one who has been ripened out of physical sensations, out of the halfway ground of the simple connections of thought into the habitual and active play of his intuitive powers.

The words by which we designate the emotions are, for the most part, very loose in their application. Of these the word feeling is the most general. It ranges through the three classes. The pains and pleasures of the body are feelings; equally so are the fears and hopes of the prudent, the delights of the artist, and the satisfaction of one obedient to moral truth. The word emotion, is applicable to the feelings of the two higher classes, hardly to those of the lower; while the word sentiment finds at least its fullest meaning in the third class only. We designate as