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than are the feelings. Indeed the most of these are so occasioned by the immediate and unavoidable presence of external conditions, that it is only indirectly and with considerable delay that volition can reach and modify them. Our thoughts, our subjects of reflection are the primary objects of volition, while the feelings are slowly changed with a change in their physical and intellectual conditions. "While the thoughts are more directly subject to the will than the emotions, the emotions more immediately influence the will than do the thoughts. Here is found -a third difference of relation. The state of feeling is the direct ground and occasion of choice, while our opinions govern the will only as they first govern the heart.

The only opportunity of confounding knowing and feeling seems to arise from their common relation to consciousness. We express the fact that our feelings, as our own, are present to the mind by the language, I know that I feel, I know that I am angry, I know that I have sympathy with the suffering. We thus seem to underlay feeling with knowing as if the one were but a peculiar form of the other. The same reasoning, however, would apply to volition, and the difficulty springs only from the defect of language. We express the simple and single fact of a feeling under the form of a double act, one branch of which is an emotion, and the other a cognition. A better analysis has enabled us to see that the expression, I know that I feel, no more implies a double act than the kindred assertion, I know that I know. An act of knowing is distinguished from one of feeling or of volition in involving a disclosure of something beyond itself. The three, in involving consciousness, stand on common ground. Herein is the bi-partite character of knowing apparent. A perception that encloses no judgments is undistinguishable from a sensation.