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or memory. Spencer justly says, " That Space and Time are 'forms of sensibilities,' or 'subjective conditions of thought,' that have no objective basis, is a belief as repugnant to common sense as any proposition that can be found." This conclusion is reached in philosophy by rejecting without reason an action of mind universally present. We do not, indeed, know the objective world in perception, since consciousness is a condition of mental phenomena only, and these are not identical with the physical phenomena which they represent or accompany; but we do know it inferentially under causation. The action of the mind herein, as clear and constant and universal as any action, implies a power or faculty whose office is to make these disclosures.

It may be said, that this view is as open as the opposite to the criticism of disregarding the general conviction, since this is not merely that we know, but that we actually see and feel, the outside world. The cases presented by the two theories are very diverse. The one rejects entirely conclusions universally accepted; the other, in careful analysis of a complex operation, refers them to an obscure element, easily and frequently overlooked. The popular mind regards sight, touch, as simple operations, and so ascribes to them our knowledge of the external world. It is deficient in analysis, not erroneous in its reference. Philosophy resolves sensation into distinct operations, and assigns to one of these, that of causal inference, the immediate proof of outside existence. It is to be claimed that the general action of the common mind should be regarded as normal; it is not to be claimed that analysis may not go farther than ordinary concrete judgments.

The mind soon learns (2) to distinguish between sensations and thoughts, between phenomena which come and go at its own bidding, and those which are entirely independent