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otherwise to confront this public sentiment, and his appeal is not to what has been or is, but to the individual idea of what ought to be. The practice therefore which would flow logically from this theory of enforced morals, is not at all the practice of the actual, ethical world; it is rather that of those classes who are feared and warred against, as always careless of the law of right, and often disobedient to it.

Kindred expositions, insufficient to cover the facts to which they are applied, are found everywhere in the works of philosophers who advocate this theory of morals. " By remorse, we understand the strongest form of self-reproach arising from a deep downfall of self-respect and esteem." The Emotions and the Will, page 106. This definition applies to a conspicuous act of misjudgment, and most plainly does not reach the fact of remorse. Again, love is said to be "as purely self-seeking as any other pleasure, and to make no inquiry as to the feelings of the beloved personality." This assertion leaves out the entire moral element which belongs to love as an affection, and is true of it only as a passion. The peculiar effect of "signal generosity" is referred to the " shock " given to the " mind totally unprepared" to see kind offices rendered to an enemy. Mill makes our sympathies with others in their injuries the basis of our sentiments of justice, a condition of feeling, certainly, which as often perverts justice as secures it. These and kindred solutions show the weakness of utilitarianism in handling striking moral facts, and how greatly it abridges and mars the facts themselves by a forced, belittling estimate of them.

Nor is the sense of obligation any more satisfactorily accounted for under this theory by referring it directly to the idea of utility. At times, Mr. Mill seems ready to do this. As the useful, in the concrete, is the pleasurable, this reference