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something sharp, and now with nothing at all; and that a certain movement of the eye, which once was followed by tin- sight of a black object, is now followed by the sight of a white object, and now by the sight of no object; it results that the idea of the particular position accompanying each one of these movements, is, by accumulated experiences, disassociated from objects and impressions, and comes to be conceived by itself; it results that as there are endless such movements, there come to be endless such positions conceived as existing apart from body, and it results that, as in the first, and in every subsequent act of perception, each position is known as co-existent with the subject, there arises a consciousness of endless such co-existent positions; that is, of space." Pages 233-4.

We find, in our criticism of this passage, fatal defects of method involved (1) in the assumption of the idea of resemblance, and (2) that also of time, the experiences considered being known as serial; also (3) in the fact that in putting these experiences on different finger-ends, Spencer uses a significant feature which is yet without significance in the experiment contemplated since the mind is supposed to be unable to note the relation involved; and (4) in the fact that in making the simultaneous excitation stand for and represent the serial excitation, he is merely substituting a section of time, already assumed, for that of space. The force of the third point will be seen, if we consider a circle of an inch between the shoulders. Touching successively such a circle in various parts, we not being able in sensation to distinguish its parts, would give us no clue to the extent of the surface involved.

We hold that these experiences must call forth at some point the idea of space, as the light under which comprehension must commence and proceed, and that they can not close with a half-formed generalization waiting farther experience