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but it makes no comparison, institutes no judgment, recalls no impressions. These, the labors of other intellectual powers, must commence and go on in the light, and this light is that of an interpreting idea. What is resemblance? It is not the red in the apple; no more is it the red on the leaf; no more is it these two sensations united in time and place. It is a specific relation between the two, intelligible as a given case of a general notion. Can the specific relation be first reached, and the general idea be deduced from it? No! As a relation it is an intellectual product, an intuition, two sensations explained in their bearings on each other under an idea. The sensations alone do not contain in their sensational matter the relation, if they did, each should contain it entire, or each a part of it and can not furnish it, nor can the intellectual movement proceed without the forecasting apprehension, the head-light. Moreover, the specific relation must express the general relation, or that relation cannot be deduced from it. Resemblance is intellectually involved in the first instance of it; and, as it is not a sensation, it must be involved for the direct apprehension of the mind there present for its interpretation. It is not the result of the judgment which expresses it, but an element and ground of that judgment. There are sensible and supersensual data for the declaration, The leaf is like the apple.

The frequent over-sight of this fact has greatly embarrassed the discussion between the two schools of philosophy. The idea of resemblance has been quietly appropriated. The observation of agreements and disagreements has been allowed to proceed as if it were purely a matter of perception, and thus a play of mind has been secured, a germ of judgment, a nucleus of thinking, with no recognized a priori material. From the elements of intellectual action thus secured, it has been comparatively easy, by patient