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he is not stating an ultimate force acting between ideas, but is falling back on the memory and judgment, and later on memory alone. Things once together in the mind are restored again to this first relation by virtue of memory. This restoration is memory, and is not to be explained by a power of images over the mind, but of the mind over images.

Association, greatly enlarged as an explanatory doctrine by Heartly, has been increasingly brought forward by later writers as an all-inclusive law of mental phenomena. Taine goes so far as to speak of the anterior and posterior portions of an idea, and ideas are made to arrange themselves and adhesively drag themselves through the mind, quite passive in reference to them. Spencer, in his Data of Ethics, p. 109 makes this concise restatement of mental processes. " The first of these elements, originally an excitement, becomes a simple sensation; then a compound sensation; then a cluster of partially presentative and partially representative sensations, forming an incipient emotion; then a cluster of exclusively ideal or representative sensations, forming an emotion proper; then a cluster of such clusters, forming a compound emotion; and eventually becomes a still more involved emotion composed of the ideal forms of such compound emotions." Mental powers have disappeared in behalf of some assumed coherence among the molecular constituents and movements of ideas; and obscure physical images have taken the place of clear mental facts. This power of association among images can in no way be explained except by referring it to cerebral states, that in some way collocate and continue themselves. But these alleged facts are unknown, obscure, inexplicable; far more so than the facts they are brought forward to illuminate. We know of no distinct coherence of nervous states that can be plausibly offered as the exact equivalents of logical processes.