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remembered as easily as a living one, a defunct thought as readily as one that has not passed away. Indeed, we do not see why any other needs to be recalled. So far as the act has not passed from consciousness, it calls for no recollection; so far as it has, it is lost to the mind, and the power to restore it involves the whole mystery. These words, restore, recall, resuscitate, are not to be allowed to mislead us by their physical imagery. The state recalled exists anew in the primitive, simple, inexplicable act of memory; a movement of mind as much of its own kind, and with its own force, as the first act of perception; and as independent, save that the occasion for it is found in the existence of previous states of consciousness. If acts of mind could be shown to the fire-flies passing from light into darkness, and darkness into light, with patient and inexhaustible alternations, it might be to the purpose; but if there must still be a distinct act of recollection, either to go in search of other acts and restore them, or when they are present to remind us of their previous presence, such an act involves the entire difficulty, and to be really anything, it must be a fresh handling of an old topic, differing from the first in that the mind knows it to be a second state of consciousness, and subject to the conditions of such a state. To reexperience sensations and recollect them, are quite different things. Much is written concerning the last, which at most would be applicable to the first only. Under this philosophy, we should be able neither to distinguish between (1) the lingering of perception in an irritable organ and memory; nor (2) between memory and repeated perception. A peculiar, primitive power is present in memory as in every other act of mind, and as a simple act, it admits and calls for no explanation. To foist on such states of consciousness, ultimate and complete in themselves, conjectural analogical explanations, is to make the simple and plain, complex