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the simple, primitive character of the act of recollection itself, some have inquired, Whether the very thing first known is the object of memory, or whether the mind is occupied with some image of it? We might as well inquire Whether the artist's conception of a painting is the very painting itself, or an image of it? It is certainly not the first, nor even the second in any other than a figurative sense. When I say that I recollect an event, my language is about as intelligible as it can be made. There is in it a direct appeal to the interpretation of every one's experience, furnishing like simple, original acts. In memory a new impression of the event is present, accompanied with a knowledge of its previous presence. It is merely a futile struggle with physical images, the misleading effect of physical analogies, which prompt us to inquire, with an analysis more cunning than cognizant of the true conditions of mental experience, Whether, as our language seems to imply, we actually remember the very object that has passed away, or whether some impression of it is restored to us? Each act of memory is a primitive act, efficient in itself for its own independent and peculiar end; is, moreover, purely subjective, though often involving a knowledge of the objective. Memory is not a repeated experience; it is the cognizance of a previous experience without repetition. The renewal of awakened action in the brain, if it could be shown to accompany recollection, would be no explanation of it. Of a like character are all the explanations of memory, which spring from purely physiological facts. Whatever may be the effect of thinking on the brain, the connection of these physical changes in a physical agent with the act of memory is wholly unintelligible. I might as well explain the recollection of a sword-wound by the presence of a scar on the body, as by any changes effected at the time in the brain by the suffering then experienced.