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straggled long and vainly with this ultimate truth, that matter affects mind and mind affects matter. They have striven to insert midway terms; they have brought down mental to physical facts, and there identified the two; they have reversed the process, and regarded perception and sensation as purely mental processes. It is well to stand with Descartes, and assert the radical division between the two sets of phenomena, so radical that facts of the one class cannot be intelligibly expressed in words of the other class. It is well to reject all explanations that explain nothing; to make no assertions of the possible and impossible which transcend experience, and imply on our part a knowledge of ultimate relations that violates their nature. It is well to stand quietly by ultimate facts, putting upon them no constructions which we cannot verify. Physical facts can be expounded under their own forms, mental facts under their forms; while their interaction, to us at least unphenomenal, is without form. The method in which a specific, organic state is transformed into a sensation, or in which a volition in turn is converted into an action, is beyond the terms of experience. So, indeed, is all transfer of forces in physics.

The fourth point is the extent to which the primitive activity of the mind is enlarged by experience. The first full discussion of this topic we owe to Bishop Berkeley. The importance attached to this secondary element in perception, these inclosed judgments, has been on the increase since his time. The organic content, or rather the activity of mind incident to this content, is the dry sponge which absorbs the inferences of experience, is expanded and made flexible and serviceable by them. There is a tendency to refer these judgments in the man as in the animal largely to instinctive action and to inheritance. As the infant and the child are manifestly for a long period employed in forming