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connection with such a use of language into utter vagueness, or onto purely physical states.

He also says: " Sensation and consciousness are both feelings. To use logical language, feeling is the genus of which sensation and consciousness are species."* Hamilton regarded consciousness as a general term for knowledge, and here it is ranked as a specific feeling with the feelings. Hamilton would say that we know that we feel, and Murphy that we feel that we know, while the fact is that we both know and feel as simple, sufficient states of mind. Mr. Murphy proceeds to refer, in a curious way of his own, distinct states of mind to distinct nervous acts; but the theory is, in reference to every one of its significant assertions, absolutely, purely hypothetical, is semi-mechanical and completely physical; if granted throughout it explains nothing in mind proper, but serves rather to obscure and destroy the fundamental connections of thought and thought, thought and feeling, thought, feeling, and volition. These physical theories of mind are wonderful examples of explanations, fictitious in their data, futile in their expositions, and destructive of the facts expounded.

There hold against them, one and all, these objections:

(1) They rest on no one known fact broad enough to sustain them. The correspondence of a definite state of brain with an exact and pure mental state has not in a single instance been made out; much less has it been shown, that the first is the invariable antecedent of the second.

(2) These solutions proceed on qualities and relations which belong to matter rather than to mind. (3) They thus subvert instead of expound the phenomena to which they are applied. (4) The explanations fail at the very moment at which they should take effect. As long as the terms are physical, they are coherent, but at the instant of

* Habit and Intelligence, vol. ii. p. 13.