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world. The minimum object which the eye can perceive may be conceived as divided into halves; neither of these will be objects of perception, yet each of them must make a distinct, though unconscious impression on the organ of vision, in order that the conjoint effect may be perceptible. "We have, then, the first conscious state in sensation secured by effects themselves unrecognized. Hence springs the inference, a conscious state of feeling or thought may be preceded by unconscious states as its conditions. We object to the analogy. The eye is a physical organ, lying between the object and the perceptive power. There may be in it action too slight to reach the mind. In the case which this fact is brought to illustrate, there is no analogous middle term between the mind and its own action. The question is, whether its own, its veritable, acts and states are always known to the mind? Now these actions are not occasioned in some intermediate substance by a foreign cause, and taken thence by consciousness, or overlooked by it, as the case may be. There is no such medium between the mind and its own acts. External, physical conditions, there doubtless are; but these constitute no part of the mind itself. Keeping the inquiry itself clearly in view, Does the mind know all that the mind itself does, all that passes in it? it will be seen that the above analogy casts no light upon the subject. If the theory is, that external forces act on the substance of the mind, or, to put the same thing in appropriate specific terms, that nervous energy animates the brain, and that a certain amount of this influence constitutes thought, while less amounts, though of the same nature, fall below consciousness, then indeed there is an analogy in the cases, and the argument so far holds; but we have reached out and out materialism. The theory on this basis offers no more explanation of the problem, How does a pure act of judgment or of memory take place, than