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two as the same is to use words for ideas. Who, by observing the one, could come to a knowledge of the other \ One might watch at his leisure the operation of Morse's telegraph, and, unless his previous knowledge furnished him the solution, make nothing evident but his own vacant mind. Yet the connection of this contrivance with language is far more mechanical and obvious than that of the brain with thought. The affirmation of subconscious phenomena is especially objectionable as playing into materialistic philosophy, as confounding the distinction between physical and mental changes, and referring real or imaginary modifications of the brain to the mind, as if the two were equivalent.

But the views of Hamilton are not intentionally open to this objection; let us briefly consider the reasons he gives for the acceptance of unconscious modifications of mind. The first of these is the extraordinary power the mind sometimes shows of recalling events, and even unintelligible sounds, as those of an unknown language, long after every trace of them seems to have passed from the memory. "Extensive systems of knowledge may, in our ordinary state, lie latent in the mind beyond the sphere of consciousness and the will; but in certain extraordinary states of organism, may again come forward into the light, and even engross the mind to the exclusion of its every day possessions."

In this argument we simply meet the old difficulty. How does the mind remember? How does it store up knowledge with no apparent store-house, accumulate mental vigor with no mental muscle wherein to lodge it, gain sharpness, precision, ease, with no underlying structure, in which these qualities may be thought of as inhering?

That memory shows unusual power under certain abnormal conditions of mind does not essentially alter the