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any way phenomena of mind, we ought to have provision made for them in our classification of mental facts. The division would then run thus: the phenomena of knowing, of feeling, of willing, and a fourth class composed of certain unknowable states, acts, conditions, or whatever you please to call them, of which we have no knowledge either in perception or consciousness, and can say nothing by way of explanation. States, then, of mind may occur of which the mind itself knows nothing, and which furnish, neither in the field of thought or of forces, any direct proof of their existence. The argument for their being is thus of the most naked and inferential character.

If it be said that these modifications are modifications of the mind itself, and not of the nature of actions, I think it must be granted, that they are thus conceived wholly under the analogy of material changes, and that if they are shown to be, and to belong anywhere, it is in the physical, and not the mental world in the brain, the instrument of the mind, and not in the very mind itself. In this last, we know, and can know, of no organic changes. Its own acts and states constitute the sum of our knowledge concerning it. Nor are we hereby rid of these alleged modifications as phenomena; nor of the consequent need of giving some clue to their mode of existence.

We are thus brought to the fundamental difficulty of this view, that it tends to confound the broad distinction between mental and physical facts especially between mental facts and those which pertain to the brain and nervous system. No matter what relations exist in the brain itself, or what changes take place in it, an observation and knowledge of these are no part of mental science, and do not necessarily, do not alone, give a clue or explanation to any one of its facts. The organic functions and dependencies of the brain are matters of as distinct and purely physical