essential condition. In man, therefore, it is not only a much more pronounced term, it extends down much farther into the organic structure than in the brute. Sensation must go before reason, since it discloses the conditions on which reason is to act. Reason gains room in the constitution of man, because sensations enlarge its field, and put it on close terms with all the operations of his inner life. As sensation expands, reason expands and as reason narrows, we have a right to infer that sensation disappears. Thus, brute life is relieved from a very large share of physical suffering.

Of intellectual sufferings, it can know very little. In the highest animals the intellect plays a subordinate part to the appetites. It is immediate in its aims, and hardly has a horizon beyond the present. This restriction in time cuts off the chief entail of suffering. It is out of to-morrow, with its anxieties and fears, that men take their chief intellectual disturbances.

(b) We exaggerate human sufferings in the same way, though not to the same extent. We unite the external states of others with our own internal feelings, and so interpret life. These two facts do not lie together. The internal and the external in every person are momentarily fitting themselves to each other, and so reaching a relative harmony to the great reduction of pain. It is only sudden changes which bring intense suffering. We imagine how we should feel if placed at once in certain unfortunate circumstances, and so expound to ourselves the feelings of persons so situated. We might