through one of its great masters, J. S. Mill, affirms that the course of nature is full of cruelty and injustice. This is an affirmation quite in order under an ethical philosophy that makes happiness the supreme test, and which overlooks the prevailing idea of moral discipline. If one, out of sympathy with the inner life of virtue, were to criticise the wisest training of a parent, whose conduct rested on a notion of right, he would almost inevitably think it both cruel and unjust. Moral discipline, judged in reference to pleasure, can hardly escape censure, for it designedly throws pleasure into the background. The criticism, therefore, is instantly met with the denial that pleasure, and the apportionment of pleasures termed justice, are the ends sought for in wise schooling. The moral discipline of the world, like that of the family, admits suffering freely, admits inequalities of pleasures and of sufferings freely, and asks but one question: Do these pains and diversities minister to growth as its necessary concomitants? This answered in the affirmative, pleasure is freely set aside, pain freely enters, and the formal divisions of justice are pronounced inapplicable. One justification, and one only, is sought for every measure --- that contained in growth. Not to institute the best conditions of growth deterred by tenderness, is unkind to institute them is both wise and kind. Justice is an idea applicable between equals, --- between man and man, --- and not one fitted to control the discipline which superior intelligence brings to inferior intelligence. Efficiency is here the ruling consideration.