may be drawn, or the action put forth. Causes can never be inadequate to the effects which depend on them. If reasons and causes were identical, the distinction between truth and falsehood would disappear, it would be swallowed up in the division of real and unreal applicable to things and events. Whatever is in the physical world has a sufficient cause, whatever is not has not a sufficient cause.

The only distinction pertinent here, therefore, is that of being and not being. The same, on the above supposition, would be true of mind. Every conclusion and every action would have a sufficient cause, and every conclusion not drawn and every action not done, would fail simply because there was no adequate ground. This distinction between the true and untrue is the distinction not only of all morality but of all thought, and its denial is, therefore, forbidden by the very first canon of reason, that no action shall be self-contradictory. This affirmation of the identity of causes and reasons is self-destructive, since it affirms one tiling to be true, and in the very act denies the distinction on which the true and the untrue rest.

We affirm, therefore, a radical diversity between physical law and logical law, between causes and reasons, between forces and motives. It will be seen that this distinction, so fundamental in the facts of the world, involves the division, so sharply discussed, between the natural and the supernatural. While the controversy has been waged most warmly in connection with miracles and answers to prayer, these are, after all, secondary questions,