guidance of this notion; at length we grow weary, and win the opportunity of rest by dismissing our guide. (4) A First Cause, thus arbitrarily affirmed, can be neither less nor more than an expression of all the causes which flow from it. It must have the same relations and the same measure with them. If we put a person in place of things, it is a deceptive substitution made possible by the darkness of distance. If we can not to-day, under the notion of causation, bring to an end a series of events in a person, we can not do it at any point in time.

If, passing by purely physical events, we take man in his intellectual and moral nature as the premises of our proof, the result will be quite the same. We have still no other idea than that of causation with which to expound that nature, or its relation to the world. The mind of man is enclosed on every side with physical forces. These forces run infinitely further back than it; they float it like an ocean; they envelope it like an atmosphere. That mind and that moral nature are only a peculiar combination of physical forces, one among the many transitional phases which forces are assuming. We have not, therefore, modified materially our premises by introducing man in them as a distinct consideration, since he is not fundamentally distinct from that general physical world of which he forms an integral part. The only result of an inquiry into phenomenal facts of any order under this notion