suppose it exists only subjectively in the intellect and not objectively in fact, then we can conceive of something greater. We can conceive of a Being who exists objectively, and this is greater than a merely mental existence."* One cannot, therefore, conceive of the non-existence of God without a logical contradiction. The idea of the most perfect Being doubtless involves self-existence, but it involves it only as a part of the idea. An idea is no less perfect as an idea because there is no fact corresponding to it. Existence is not a perfection; it is a mere question of facts. Anselm, when pushed with this obvious consideration, that perfection nowhere else carries with it real being, made answer, that no other idea was logically parallel with this idea of God, that no other idea contained the notion of necessary existence as part of its perfection. This last statement is true, but does not effect the argument. If actual existence is an addition to the perfection of the idea of God, so would it be to that of a circle. If perfection in one form carries with it no proof of reality, we can give no sufficient reason why it should in its most comprehensive form. It is the notion of self-existence, not actual self-existence, which the perfection of the idea covers. This a priori argument is not generally felt to be valid. Since it has demonstrative force, if it has any force, this extended rejection of it is wholly destructive of its practical worth, and indicates an inherent weakness never removed.

The argument, as modified by Descartes, is not a priori. He starts with the same idea, as present in

*History of Christian Doctrines, vol. i, p. 231.