as presenting none of them, is trebly unthinkable."* We may grant this in reference to the judgment, but the judgment is a secondary power, whose data are always given to it in ultimate analysis. To affirm that anything is unknowable because it is unthinkable, is to overlook intuitive knowledge, both of the reason and of the senses. The results of a thinking process are only a portion, and in time at least a secondary portion, of our knowledge. We are quite willing to grant that the infinite is not found among these products of thought.

The objection that all knowledge is relative is of much the same nature. If we were to grant the assertion, the concession would cover the whole ground of knowledge, and so exclude fundamental truth from all knowledge. If relativity excludes known truth from knowledge, it must exclude it from the knowledge of the finite as well as from that of the infinite. If the relativity of knowledge is not destructive of all knowledge, we must be further shown why it is destructive of that of the infinite and not also of that of the finite. If there is absolutely nothing but a personal impression in our finite knowledge, then that knowledge is no true knowledge, and cannot lie between man and man. If there is something more than subjective impressions in current thought, then there may easily be in our thought of God.

But there is no truth in the assertion that knowledge is all relative. Sensations and perceptions have a personal physical element which we cannot

* First Principles, p. 82.