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we have granted to be a theoretic possibility. We can find, therefore, in philosophy alone no sufficient reason for saying in the same breath, that a thing may be, and denying that it ever will be. The last assertion must rest on some special, empirical reason; since the first assertion sweeps the ground of philosophy and says, that there is nothing to prevent it. Our philosophy, then, as philosophy, is no more encumbered with the assertion, that the will does choose, than with the declaration, it may choose, either alternative. The general principles which admit the one statement, will cover the other. The fact, that an admitted possibility never does become actual, must be established, if established at all, on special reasons peculiar to the case. If there were a general principle or law against . the action, it would not remain possible.

Moreover this theory establishes an inductive law, of the strongest possible character, against itself. Admittedly, the weakest motive, so termed, never is chosen. There is an absolutely uniform line of action in innumerable and most diversified cases. No law of induction is established on stronger grounds. Yet, when we are just about to reach the conclusion, that what, under no circumstances, is or ever will be done, is an action excluded by the very nature and method of the forces at work, we are suddenly bidden to face around by the very unexpected assertion, the choice under discussion is one that may constantly be made. On what ground does this odd inversion rest? Not on that of induction, for this line of argument prepares the way with well-nigh irresistible power for exactly the opposite statement. Not on philosophical principles, for, as previously shown, these principles would show that what may at any time happen, probably, under the inexhaustible variety of circumstances presented by human life, will happen. This assertion, then, that the will may, but never does, choose